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Résumé / Abstract
Cet article examine empiriquement l'impact du partage du travail sur la
productivité des travailleurs d'une grande firme canadienne. L'application de la
semaine réduite de travail pendant un an au sein de cette entreprise nous permet de
comparer analytiquement la productivité des employés avant et après l'adoption de
ce programme. Nos résultats révèlent que l'expérimentation de la semaine réduite
de travail provoque une baisse significative de la productivité des travailleurs.
This paper is the first to examine empirically how work sharing
influences workers' productivity, using a unique data set from a large Canadian
firm. This firm has adopted a work sharing scheme for one year, which allows us
to introduce a "natural experiment approach" of comparing workers'
productivity before and after the implementation of work sharing. We find that
work sharing has led to a significant decrease in labor productivity.
Mots Clés : Productivité, partage du travail, modes d'organisation du travail
Keywords : Productivity, Work Sharing, Work Organisation Methods
 A well documented American success story, Lincoln Electric Company, has a no layoff1
policy; see, for example Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 338).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the Great Depression, the idea of work sharing or reducing the
standard work week, has gained popularity, as a policy to reduce unemployment
(OECD, 1994). Much of this popularity has stemmed from the political arena (see, for
example Conyers forward to McGaughey, 1980) and the policy's attractive feature of
(potentially) sharing the burden of unemployment amongst the workforce.
Alternatively, if unemployment gives rise to social problems such as the increased
incidence of health problems (Merrigan et al. 1995, Shearer and Marceau 1995)
society may benefit from the reduced costs associated with a reduction in the
unemployment rate.
As many authors have noted the effectiveness of work sharing in reducing
unemployment will depend on how firms react to the policy (see, for example,
Ehrenberg and Schumann 1982). There are undoubtedly some benefits to firms of
work sharing.  For example, during economic downswings work sharing may allow
firms to maintain a skilled labour force thus avoiding future hiring and training costs
(Lacroix 1995). Furthermore, the ability to avoid layoffs may improve industrial
relations and worker moral .  Yet, the same hiring and training costs that render layoffs1
unprofitable also reduce the desirability of substituting new hires for hours worked by
existing employees (Fortin 1989).  Thus, the trade off between hours worked by
existing employees and new hires may be less than one to one.
Another factor affecting a firm's response to worksharing is the effects of the
program on worker productivity. For example, if working fewer hours per week
reduces worker fatigue, workers may become more productive thus further reducing
the incentive to hire more workers (Reid 1982). Alternatively, work sharing may
introduce coordination costs that reduces worker productivity.  That is, if the reduction
in hours worked implies some workers must finish tasks that were started by others.
This sharing of tasks can lead to lost time that is needed to coordinate actions. 
While these ideas are not new, little empirical work has been done to
measure the consequences of work sharing. While some macroeconomic studies have
examined the impact of reduced work time on employment (Drèze 1986), data that
would permit the measurement of the productivity effects of work sharing has
generally not been available.  This paper presents a simple model of worker
productivity under work sharing that allows for the effects of fatigue and coordination
costs. We apply these ideas to productivity data collected from the archives of a large
2Canadian telecommunications company. This company recently implemented a work
sharing program, largely in response to increased competition resulting from a recent
deregulation of the telecommunications industry in Canada. We consider this change
in government policy as an exogenous event and treat the data as the result of a natural
experiment. Comparing average productivity before and after the introduction of the
program allows us to measure the effect of work sharing on worker productivity. We
argue that coordination costs are task specific and identify those tasks in which they
are likely to be more important.
Our results suggest that average worker productivity was reduced during the
worksharing program by between 3% and 8%. We argue that coordination costs
cannot, however, provide a complete explanation for this reduction since productivity
decreases in tasks for which coordination costs would seem to play an insignificant
role. We thus provide some alternative explanations and make suggestions for further
research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the work
sharing experiment as it was implemented in the firm. Section 3 presents the model
and predictions on the impact of work sharing on productivity. In Section 4 we
describe the data and our econometric methodology. Section 5 presents and discusses
the results and Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2. THE WORK SHARING "EXPERIMENT"
The Canadian firm that provided us with our data is large (around 40 000
workers in 1994) and works in the telecommunication industry (mainly telephones).
In this study, we consider the Quebec component of the firm (18,613 employees in
1994).  At the end of 1993, facing increasing competition due to a recent deregulation,
the firm offered its workers a vast work sharing program including reduction in the
regular number of hours worked during the week (with reduced salary), a program of
special holidays (for studies, parental leave, etc.), an incentive scheme to quit the
company, and a program for early retirement.  It was mentioned at the start that the
program would last one year (January to December 1994).
For the purpose of our study, we concentrate on the part of the program
associated with a reduced working week.  This program induced a change from a "8
hours per day/5 days a week" work pattern to a "9 hours per day/4 days a week" one.
For certain categories of workers (mainly telephonists and office workers), the scheme
was made voluntary, while for others more in an "excess supply" position (the
technicians), it was made compulsory.
 Most of the time, technicians responsible for repairs do not install phones and vice-versa.2
 Indeed, in the commercial sector, an installation of a very large and sophisticated telephone3
system in a big firm is counted the same way as the installation of a phone in a corner store.
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Our objective was to examine the impact of this work sharing scheme on
workers'productivity (being broadly defined as a measure of outputs divided by a
measure of inputs).  In order to do so, we wanted to focus on an area of the firm's
activities where outputs and inputs were measurable and relatively uniform, where
these measures were available before the implementation of the scheme and after, and
where the scheme was extensively adopted.
After discussion with officials of the company, we rapidly decided that the
study would focus on the technicians installing and repairing phones  in the residential2
sector (as opposed with the commercial sector).  As mentioned earlier, these workers
were forced to adopt the reduced working week, the number of hours they work is
available since 1992 for certain workers and since 1993 for others, their output (as
will be described below) is measured on a regular basis, again since 1992 for certain
items and 1993 for others, and is more uniform than that of the commercial sector .3
For a better understanding of our analysis, it is useful to describe more
precisely the typical routine of these workers.  The technicians spend the day "on the
road", with a truck from the company.  Every morning, they pick up the truck at a
central garage in the area where they are working, and a list of addresses where there
are requests for repair or phone installation.  Their productivity (number of repairs or
installations per hour worked) is not only related to their own ability, but also to the
time they take to go from one address to the next.  In the case of the installations,
which are longer operations (as will be shown below), it is possible that the worker
cannot complete the task during the day it was started and has to go back the day after.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
We construct a model of the relationship between productivity per worker
and hours worked in the presence of setup costs, which is suitable with the working
context described above.  We concentrate on two factors that affect this relationship.
First, workers may fatigue as they work more hours rendering the production function
concave in hours worked.  Second, we allow for setup costs in the form of hours spent
at work for which no output is produced. These setup costs result from the sharing of
tasks that occurs under work sharing due to the reduced hours worked by each
 We implicitely assume that productivity is not function of the capital stock (building,4
equipment, material, etc) since discussions with the company's officials convinced us that, in
the context of this study, it was constant throughout the period.
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individual worker.  Namely, some workers may be forced to finish tasks that were
started by other workers.  
It is important to note that our goal is to present a fairly general model of
productivity that would be plausible within this environment.  We do not attempt to
model the optimal behaviour of the firm taking these setup costs into account as we
believe the existence of the work sharing experiment suggests that the firm did not
know the exact nature of the production function.
Let the production function in the absence of work sharing be given by
(1a)
where h is the number of hours worked per week .  We assume4
that The concavity of f captures the effects of fatigue.
Under the work sharing program, productivity becomes
(1b)
where c represents the coordination costs that arise under the work sharing scheme.
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the production function.
Under the work sharing program weekly hours worked were reduced.  We
define average productivity to be the total productivity per worker divided by the
number of hours worked.  That is,
We first consider the effects on average productivity of introducing a work
sharing program in the absence of setup costs.
 This is actually the situation depicted in Figure 1.5
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Result 1:
In the absence of any setup costs, a reduction in weekly hours worked increases
average productivity.
Proof:  See Appendix.
The proof follows directly from the concavity of the production function.
We now consider the effects of introducing the work sharing program in the
presence of setup costs.  Let h  and h  denote respectively the number of hours worked0 1
before and after the work sharing program was introduced.  Furthermore, define the
function to be the difference in average productivity under the two
schemes.  That is,
Result 2:
There exists a value of c = c  < h  such that AP(h , c ) = AP(h , c ).* * * 51 1 0
Proof:  See Appendix.
Corollary 2.1:
Tasks with higher coordination costs are more likely to exhibit decreased average
productivity during work sharing.
Proof:  See Appendix.
6Result 2 and the corollary show that average productivity can increase or
decrease depending on the size of the coordination costs and that, the larger are the
coordination costs, the more likely is productivity to decrease.  In effect, the setup cost
that results from the work sharing program reduces the average productivity of any
given number of hours worked.  This is due to the lost time in which workers must
coordinate with other workers.  The size of the reduction in average productivity is
proportional to the amount of time lost.  The overall effect is ambiguous since the
reduction in hours increases average productivity as workers are less fatigued.
This result is important since the size of coordination costs may be task
specific.  In particular, tasks which are more complex and which take a long period
of time to complete, are more likely to be interrupted and require finishing by someone
else.  Such tasks are more likely to demonstrate decreased average productivity as a
result of the work sharing program.
Empirical Implications
We seek to measure the effect of work sharing on average worker productivi-
ty.  Our results suggest that this effect will depend on the hours worked, the extent of
coordination costs.  We have argued that coordination costs are likely to be task
specific.  We will therefore allow for the productivity relation to depend on the task
performed j. 
(2)
where AP  is the productivity per hour per worker in task j, h is the hours worked, dj
indicates the work sharing program, T captures transportation costs, and X represents
a vector of control variables representing human capital and demand side characteris-
tics.  Transportation costs are important since workers travel from site to site in order
to install and repair phones.  Furthermore, workers in large cities, i.e. Montréal, are
expected to have smaller distances between calls than workers in rural areas.  Also,
transportation time is likely to be longer in the winter months, when roads are in poor
condition.
4. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
Our data set includes information on aggregate productivity and hours
worked for four geographical regions of the province of Quebec: 1) Montreal; 2)
Quebec City; 3) The South Shore of the St-Lawrence River; and 4) The North Shore
 Following discussions with the company's officials, it became clear that it was important6
to distinguish between reinstallations and new installations since both involve very different
tasks. A reinstallation can be, for example, the installation of an extra phone in an existing house.
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of the St-Lawrence River. The technicians in our data set are responsible for repairing
and installing telephones. Installations can be of two types: new installations, when
phones are installed in new houses, and reinstallations, when phones are installed in
houses that previously had phones installed in them. New installations tend to be more
complicated and time consuming activities since original wiring must be completed .6
We have collected monthly productivity measures on each of these tasks.
These are: the number of new installations per hour worked (NEW INSTALLA-
TIONS); the number of reinstallations per hour worked (REINSTALLATIONS); and
the number of repairs per hour worked (REPAIRS). An additional measure, the
number of hours between the time a repair is requested and its completion (DELAY),
was also collected. These productivity measures were available from January 1992 to
August 1995 for REPAIRS and DELAY, and form January 1993 to August 1995 for
NEW INSTALLATIONS and REINSTALLATIONS. Furthermore, data on NEW
INSTALLATIONS were not available for the Quebec City region. We therefore have
176 observations on the variables REPAIRS and DELAY, 128 observations on the
variable REINSTALLATIONS and 96 observations on the variable  NEW INSTAL-
LATIONS.
Descriptive statistics on these measures are presented in Table 1. For each
measure, we present the productivity per hour worked during and prior to the work
sharing experiment (per region and for the whole province). We also present the
descriptive statistics of the independent variables used (to be described below).  The
average delay in completing repairs during and prior to work sharing is also presented.
Notice that new installations is the most time consuming activity; average
productivity per hour is lower (0.311 new installations completed prior to work
sharing) than for both reinstallations (0.89 per hour) and repairs (0.636 per hour).
This is consistent with the idea that new installations are more likely to be affected by
coordination costs. Namely, it is more likely that tasks started by one technician will
have to be completed by another when hours are reduced. We therefore expect the
work sharing program to result in a larger reduction in productivity in new installa-
tions than for the other tasks. The last columns of Table 1 demonstrate that average
productivity decreased in each task under work sharing. Yet, the largest percentage
decrease in average productivity was experienced in new installations (8.03%).  This
tendency is observable in all regions except Montreal.
 Specifically, the WORK SHARING dummy is then defined as 1 - 1/12 Z  where Z is the7 2
number of months since the implementation of the work sharing program.
 For historical reasons, most people in Quebec who move from one place to another do8
it at the beginning of July.
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We thus consider four separate specifications of equation (2); one for each
of the available measures of productivity: REPAIRS, DELAY, NEW
INSTALLATIONS, and REINSTALLATIONS. In each case (except delay), we use
productivity per hour worked as our dependent variable. As for independent variables
we include the total hours worked (HOURS) to identify returns to scale. To capture
the effects of the work sharing program on productivity we define a dummy variable
WORK SHARING equal to one for all observations when the program was in place,
and zero otherwise. Note that the use of such a dummy variable implicitly assumes that
the work sharing program causes an immediate shift upward or downward in
productivity and that this change is constant throughout the program. Other patterns
are, of course, possible (Box, 1983). For example, one can imagine that work sharing
creates a shock effect that changes productivity immediately, but that gradually
workers adjust themselves to the new working environment so as to eventually return
to the initial level of productivity. We experiment with a number of different patterns,
but find that a model including a standard dummy variable and a model in which the
impact is decreasing through time at an increasing rate  best fit the data.7
To capture the effects of transportation costs on production, we include
regional dummies (North-Shore is the default) and seasonal dummies (winter is the
default). We expect transportation costs to be lower in Montreal than in the other
regions since the population density is higher. Furthermore, transportation is more
difficult in the winter than the summer due to road conditions. Seasonal dummies will
also pick up seasonal variations in demand particularly important for new installations
which, in Quebec, tend to be concentrated in the summer months .8
To control for the quality of the labour force, we include the variable NEW
EMPLOYEES. This accounts for the fact that during the period May 1994 to
September 1994 the firm had to used some inexperienced workers to work as
technicians in order to meet increased demand.
Finally, discussions with company officials led us to include the variable
SMALL ORDERS in the REINSTALLATION equation to control for the difficulty
of the required task. One example of a small order is when the order only requires
changing the colour of the phone.
 Preliminary tests were performed to detect the presence of heteroskedasticity and/or serial9
correlation. These tests showed that first-order serial correlations was a problem, and estimations
were corrected using the well-known technique of Corchrane and Orcutt.
 The interaction terms between WORK SHARING and the REGIONAL DUMMIES are10
generally non-significant, implying that the impact of work sharing on productivity is uniform
across regions.
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Empirical estimation was performed using ordinary least-squares  and the log9
of average productivity as the dependent variable.  Table 2 presents the results for our
four productivity measures.  We present three specifications for each equation
allowing for MONTHLY instead of SEASONAL dummies, and for interaction terms
between the WORK SHARING variable and the REGIONAL dummies to see if the
impact of work sharing was constant across regions.  Log-likelihood ratio tests led us
to conclude that, for the REPAIRS, DELAY, and REINSTALLATIONS, the specifi-
cation with seasonal dummies and no interaction term provided the best fit, while for
the NEW INSTALLATION, the one with monthly dummies and no interaction term
was best. 
First, it is noteworthy that, in each case, WORK SHARING has led to a
significant decline in productivity (8.6 % for REINSTALLATIONS; 8.3 % for NEW
INSTALLATIONS; 3 % for REPAIRS and 13 % for DELAY) .  In the first three10
cases, it is the WORK SHARING variable defined as a conventional dummy variable
that better fits the data, while in the last case (the delays), the impact is declining
through time.  Conversations with the company's officials provided us with further
insights on this feature of the results.  They mentioned that the tendency of the average
delay to be increasing rapidly during the first months of 1994 was the first signal that
productivity was declining. Specific actions were taken to reduce these delays (e.g.,
moving employees across sectors and hirings), which were effective as suggested by
our result.
Furthermore, these results suggest that the impact of work sharing on
productivity is "task specific" and that longer operations (installations), for which the
coordination cost is likely to be higher, are more affected.
The coefficients of the variable capturing the number of HOURS worked
indicate that average productivity is not affected by the number of hours worked for
the REPAIRS and the REINSTALLATIONS, while the provision of NEW
INSTALLATIONS is affected negatively by the number of hours worked.
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The REGIONAL dummies show that workers in the Montreal region are
significantly more productive (21 % for REPAIRS; 16 % for REINSTALLATIONS
and 46 % for NEW INSTALLATIONS) than in the others.  This suggests that the
higher density of the population in the Montreal reduce transportation time between
"calls", enhancing workers'productivity. Furthermore, workers in the South-Shore
region are less productive (5 %) in the REPAIR sector.
Moreover, SEASONAL and MONTHLY dummies indicate that productivity
is higher in the NEW INSTALLATIONS and REINSTALLATIONS areas during
summer months (respectively 42.1 % and 10. 7 %), and during the fall (respectively
12.4 % and 10.5 %); winter is default.  This suggests that there are strong economies
of scale since most installations take place during these months, which make trips
between calls shorter enhancing workers' productivity, and that tranportation costs are
higher during winter.
Furthermore, the variable capturing the "quality" of labour used, NEW
EMPLOYEES, has everywhere a positive coefficient (significant in the NEW
INSTALLATION equation).  This suggests unexpectedly that the arrival of new
inexperienced employees has enhanced productivity. Finally, as expected, small orders
are associated with higher productivity in the REINSTALLATION area.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper has examined empirically how work sharing influences
workers'productivity, using a unique data set from a large Canadian firm.  This firm
has adopted a work sharing scheme for one year, which allowed us to introduce a
"natural experiment approach" of comparing workers'productivity before and after the
implementation of work sharing.
Our results showed that work sharing has induced a significant reduction in
productivity (from 3 % to 8.6 %). While the results are broadly consistent with the
presence of coordination costs in the production function, it is clear that other factors
must be playing a role as well in determining productivity. For example, even though
new installations are a more complex and time consuming task than are reinstallations,
a larger percentage decrease in productivity was displayed in reinstallations.
Another possible contributing factor to the decrease in productivity is the
change in the work schedule that was introduced along with the work sharing program.
Namely that workers changed from working 8 hours a day for 5 days a week to
working 9 hours a day for 4 days a week. It is possible that the extra hour tacked onto
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the end of the day was much less productive than the hours worked on the fifth day of
the week. Unfortunately without information on daily production, our data set does not
permit us to identify such effects. One further possibility is that worker morale may
have been negatively affected by the work sharing program. Given that technicians
were not given a choice of whether or not to participate in the program whereas other
types of workers were, technicians may have felt they were being unfairly treated
(Akerlof 1982). The fact that absenteism increased following the introduction of the
program lends support to this interpretation.
Interestingly, this analysis was presented to the top officials of the company,
and we used our results to raise a certain number of questions about managerial
practices.  First, it is not clear why the relative advantage of the Montreal area is more
than two times as high for new installations than for repairs.  Is it due to heterogeneity
across workers (indicating that Montreal workers in the installations sector are more
productive than their colleagues in the repairs sector)?  Or, is it a sign that those in the
installation sectors are better managed?  Similarly, why are the technicians in the
South-Shore area less productive than others in the repair sector, but not in the
installation sector?  Why is there decreasing marginal productivity in the new
installation sector and not in the others?  Why is productivity higher during summer
and fall, especially for NEW INSTALLATION; is it uniquely due to economies of
scale?  Or, is it a sign that workers could be more productive the rest of the time?  And
finally, why are new inexperienced workers contributing to raise productivity?  Such
an exercise shows that regression analysis with a company's database can be useful in
better understanding workers' performance.
Finally, we note the fact that the work sharing program was not pursued after
a year, which suggests that the productive consequences may have been neglected
when introducing the work sharing scheme. While further research on the impact of
similar programs in other companies is needed to corroborate this result, we believe
the demonstrated decrease in productivity signals an important consideration for other
firms and governments considering implementing such a program.
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Figure 1 : Worksharing and Productivity
( Figure 1 is not available in electronic version )
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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
      For repairs, reinstallation and new installation : Impact of work sharing on productivity is represented by11
immediate shift upward or downward that is constant throughout work sharing period.
For delay : Impact of work sharing on productivity is represented by an immediate drop in productivity, but gradually,
workers adjust themselves to this working environment so as to return to the initial level of productivity.
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Table 2
Impact of Work Sharing on Productivity11
Estimated Coefficient (standard errors)
Repairs Delay
Intercept -0.596(0.244)
-0.273
(0.379)
-0.598
(0.248)
-0.366
(0.482)
-1.460
(0.747)
-0.316 
(0.487)
Hours worked 0.011(0.027)
-0.026
(0.042)
0.012
 (0.028)
0.393 
(0.054)
0.518 
(0.083)
0.387 
(0.055)
Work sharing -0.031(0.015)
-0.054
(0.027)
-0.055
(0.030)
0.122 
(0.034)
0.156 
(0.039)
0.103 
(0.036)
Montreal 0.191(0.022)
0.181
 (0.026)
0.175 
(0.026)
-0.268
(0.050)
-0.279
(0.049)
-0.269 
(0.048)
Quebec -0.029(0.021)
-0.032
(0.023)
-0.028
(0.025)
0.126
 (0.123)
0.141 
(0.107)
0.132
 (0.095)
South-shore -0.042(0.021)
-0.05 
(0.024)
-0.052
(0.024)
-0.063
(0.044)
-0.065
(0.044)
-0.064 
(0.043)
Montreal*wo
rk sharing
0.057 
(0.041)
0.058 
(0.044)
0.0197
(0.112)
0.074 
(0.115)
Quebec*work
sharing
-0.003
(0.041)
-0.001
(0.041)
0.128
 (0.079)
0.179 
(0.077)
South-
Shore*work
sharing
0.044
 (0.041)
0.043 
(0.041)
-0.013
(0.081)
0.042
 (0.081)
Summer 0.027(0.018)
0.028
 (0.019)
-0.096
(0.037)
-0.094
 (0.037)
Spring -0.003(0.013)
-0.003
(0.014)
-0.058
(0.027)
-0.056 
(0.027)
Autumn 0.014(0.015)
0.014
 (0.016)
-0.060
(0.030)
-0.057 
(0.031)
% New
employees
0.604
(0.368)
0.546 
(0.405)
0.552 
(0.384)
1.257 
(0.704)
0.227 
(0.754)
1.37 
(0.713)
% Small
orders
Monthly
dummies No Yes No No Yes No
Log of the
likelihood
function
276.71 281.78 278.47 149.67 164.57 151.07
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Table 2 (suite)
Impact of Work Sharing on Productivity
Estimated Coefficient (standard errors)
Reinstallations New Installations
Intercept 0.301(0.352)
0.018
(0.457)
0.266
(0.345)
-0.283
(0.394)
1.743
(0.674)
-0.376
(0.383)
Hours
worked
-0.055
(0.045)
-0.025
(0.054)
-0.051
(0.044)
-0.128
(0.046)
-0.362
(0.079)
-0.116
(0.044)
Work sharing -0.09(0.031)
-0.141
(0.047)
-0.141
(0.049)
-0.081
(0.027)
-0.087
(0.044)
-0.122
(0.039)
Montreal 0.151(0.045)
0.143
(0.056)
0.129
(0.049)
0.371
(0.026)
0.386
(0.039)
0.331
(0.032)
Quebec 0.116(0.034)
0.091
(0.039)
0.087
(0.041)
South-shore 0.012(0.033)
-0.001
(0.038)
0.004
(0.040)
-0.020
(0.026)
-0.077
(0.039)
-0.027
(0.031)
Montreal*
work sharing
0.095
(0.062)
0.092
(0.065)
0.061
(0.057)
0.098
(0.049)
Quebec*
work sharing
0.108
(0.064)
0.092
(0.067)
South-
Shore*work
sharing
0.015
(0.062)
0.019
(0.064)
0.007
(0.056)
0.027
(0.049)
Summer 0.102(0.042)
0.098
(0.042)
0.352
(0.041)
0.348
(0.039)
Spring -0.027(0.035)
-0.029
(0.034)
-0.067
(0.035)
-0.072
(0.034)
Autumn 0.100(0.037)
0.100
(0.036)
0.117
(0.035)
0.114
(0.033)
% New
employees
0.071
(0.098)
0.004
(0.097)
0.056
(0.096)
0.263
(0.108)
0.314
(0.112)
0.252
(0.102)
% Small
 orders
0.167
(0.071)
0.085
(0.103)
0.135
(0.071)
Monthly
dummies No Yes No No Yes No
Log of the
 likelihood
 function
86.13 97.59 87.74 68.12 103.43 70.29
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Appendix
Proof of Result 1:
     By the Mean Value Theorem there exists 0 < h  < h  such that1 0
Since 
Proof of Result 2:
Define to be the difference in average products before and after work
sharing; that is,
Note that G is a continuous function in c with
Furthermore,
by Result 1, and
since f0) = 0. Therefore, there must be a value of c denoted c  that*
solves
Proof of Corollary 2.1
     The proof follows directly from the derivative of G with repect to c.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics - Mean and standard deviation
Montreal North Shore South Shore
Repairs Delay Reinstal. Newinstallat. Repairs Delay Reinstal.
New
installat. Repairs Delay Reinstal.
New
installat.
Worker's
productivity
with work
sharing
0.744
(0.027)
23.06
(4.73)
0.955
(0.185)
0.382
(0.074)
0.597
(0.039)
27.03
(5.17)
0.720
(0.095)
0.253
(0.052)
0.593
(0.044)
25.60
(5.93)
0.725
(0.095)
0.261
(0.077)
Worker's
productivity
without work
sharing
0.745
(0.034)
18.95
(3.64)
0.99
(0.122)
0.376
(0.079)
0.609
(0.037)
23.50
(3.80)
0.830
(0.116)
0.277
(0.053)
0.590
(0.038)
 22.67
(3.21)
0.823
(0.096)
0.280
(0.068)
Hours worked
/ month
10410
(2888) ------
3321
(1171)
8358
(2023)
9249
(2855) -------
2715
(843)
7311
(2892)
9626
(2744) -------
3253
(1101)
5842
(2697)
% of new
employees
0.005
(0.018) ------
0.054
(0.146)
0.054
(0.146)
0.003
(0.01) ------
0.056
(0.151)
0.056
(0.151)
0.007
(0.02) ------
0.048
(0.129)
0.048
(0.129)
% of small
orders ------- -------
0.733
(0.060) ------ ------- -------
0.491
(0.099) ------ ------ ------
0.479
(0.094) ------
Table 1 (suite)
Descriptive statistics - Mean and standard deviation
Quebec Total
Repairs Delay Reinstal. Newinstallat. Repairs Delay Reinstal.
New
installat.
Worker's
productivity
with work
sharing
0.576
(0.032)
30.94
(6.99)
0.904
(0.127) ------
0.627
(0.077)
26.66
(6.28)
0.826
(0.166)
0.286
(0.087)
Worker's
productivity
without work
sharing
0.602
(0.043)
26.77
(5.76)
0.916
(0.133) ------
0.636
(0.074)
22.97
(5.02)
0.890
(0.135)
0.311
(0.081)
Hours worked
/ month
8079
(2299) ------
2459
(894) -------
9341.71
(2813.18) ------
2937.52
(1064.08)
7170.84
(2741.54)
% of new
employees
0.005
(0.015) ------
0.077
(0.209)
0.077
(0.209)
0.005
(0.016) ------
0.053
(0.141)
0.059
(0.161)
% of small
orders ------- -------
0.559
(0.115) ------ ------ ------
0.565
(0.138) ------
